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Our Passive-Aggressive Model of Civil Adjudication
Thomas 0. Main*
It is a privilege to participate in a symposium that honors Professor Michael
Vitiello. A symposium that interrogates questions about access to civil justice is
an especially apt tribute. Professor Vitiello's recent book helps us appreciate the
importance of these questions and reminds us of our obligation to pursue answers
to these questions.' In this brief essay, I offer one original observation and pose
two new questions about the vanishing civil trial. My contribution is descriptive
but normative in the sense that history reveals patterns and alternatives.
Two characteristics of contemporary civil practice and procedure are familiar
to all who practice or study in this area. First, the civil trial is disappearing. 2 In
2018, there were approximately 2,500 civil trials in federal court.3 This is about
one-third of the total number of civil cases that federal courts tried in 1940. 4 During
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am grateful to Mary-Beth Moylan, Michael Vitiello, Michael Hopkins, and the University of the Pacific Law
Review for the opportunity to participate in this symposium. Thanks also to Linda Mullenix, Don Doernberg,
Rich Freer, Stephen Subrin, Paige Hall, and David McClure for helping me develop these ideas.
1. MICHAEL VITIELLO, ANIMATING CIVIL PROCEDURE (2017).
2. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL & LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); Hon. William G. Young, Vanishing Trials,
Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67 (2006); Hon. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Where
Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo? A Trial Judge's Lament Over the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial, 4 FED. CTS. L.
REV. 99 (2010); Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L. REV. 399 (2011); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation
Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119 (2002); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements,
Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, I J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004).
3. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-4 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 AO REPORT].
4. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. 7 (1940) [hereinafter 1940 AO REPORT] (reporting 7,402 civil trials).
The 1940 federal judiciary tried three times as many civil cases as the 2018 federal judiciary, even though the
latter had more than three times the number of federal judges, bigger and better courthouses, a more generous
budget, and more robust staffs (including magistrate judges, law clerks, and judges with senior status). See
Thomas 0. Main, Procedural Constants: How Delay Aversion Shapes Reform, 15 NEV. L.J. 1597, 1606 (2015)
(citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 27-28 (1996); Stephen B.
Burbank et al., Leaving the Bench, 1970-2009. The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences Those
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that same timeframe, the percentage of cases that are tried has fallen steadily from
20% to 1%.' Second, most cases settle. Studies estimate that about two-thirds of
cases are resolved by agreement of the parties as opposed to some court-ordered
resolution of the parties' rights and responsibilities.6 The percentage of cases that
settle has been relatively constant over time.
7
Courts must resolve cases that do not settle-either by trial or motion. Of
course, there is a relationship between cases that settle and cases that do not. The
occurrence of settlements-and the precise contours of those settlements-are
precipitated and shaped by the cases that do not settle.8 The settlement value of a
case is impacted by its merit, and its merit, in turn, is determined by the outcomes
of cases decided by courts.9 For decades, commentators have used the metaphor of
a shadow to describe how parties negotiate settlements in the shadow of the law.'
0
In addition to relying on the metaphor of a shadow, I refer to settlement and judicial
determination, respectively, as the passive and aggressive components of our
system of adjudication. Both of these components are essential. Aggressive
determinations resolve cases that cannot be settled and cast shadows that passively
facilitate settlements. Settlements lighten the judiciary's workload, allowing
judges to allocate more time to cases that do not settle.
Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 93 (2012); Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the
Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456 (1983); Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources,
Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2605 (1998); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,
Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning o] Article Ill, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 949 (2000).
5. 1940 AO REPORT, supra note 4 (7,402 / 37,367 = 19.8%). 2018 AO REPORT, supra note 3 (2,469
247,741 = 0.9%).
6. Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 146 (2009) ("if a single settlement rate is to be invoked, it should be that about
two-thirds of civil cases settle .... ).
7. See Hadfield, supra note 2, at 706; Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle ". Judicial
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994); Robert 1. Weil, This Judge for
Hire, CAL. LAW. 41,42 (Aug. 1992) (reporting that 67 of every 100 cases settle); Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication
to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 163 (1986) (finding in a study of 1,600 federal and state
cases, approximately two-thirds of all civil cases settled).
8. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don 't Know (and Think
We Know) About Our Allegedly Contention and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 32-35 (1983) (discussing
"courts as sources of bargaining and regulatory endowments"); James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe,
Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171, 172 n.6
(2001).
9. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom in Dispute
Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEV. L.J. 305, 347 n.149 (2003) (explaining
how informal dispute resolution is dependent upon the "likely outcomes if [a] dispute is adjudicated to
conclusion"); Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64
TEx. L. REV. 687, 715 (1985) (stating "the formal legal systems provides an important source of bargaining
endowments and social values that shape the outcomes of out-of-court settlements").
10. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow o] the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979) (describing how "[d]ivorcing parents do not bargain.., in a vacuum" but
instead "bargain in the shadow of the law" as each side understands it); see also Barak D. Richman, Norms and
Law: Putting the Horse Before the Cart, 62 DUKE L.J. 739, 744 (2012) (tracing origins of the metaphor to Martin
Shapiro's 1975 book).
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In an earlier era, trials were the paradigmatic form of aggressive dispute
resolution." But beginning in the late 1970s, under Chief Justice Burger's
leadership, the trial became something to be avoided rather than celebrated. 12
Specifically, trials were characterized as a failure of judicial case management. 13
Because trials were discouraged, district judges needed a substitute to dispose of
cases and to cast required shadows. 4 The emergence of our now-familiar pre-trial
motion practice corresponds in both time and magnitude with the disappearance of
trials. Specifically, Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and Rule 56 motions for
summary judgment have replaced trials as the aggressive component of formal
adjudication. ' 5 Heightened pleading emerged in the lower courts in the late 1970s
and, after decades of fits and starts, was ultimately endorsed by the United States
Supreme Court in 2007.16 A summaryjudgment with bite similarly emerged in the
lower courts in the late 1970s, and the United States Supreme Court adopted it in
1986.17
These pretrial motions account for a relatively small percentage of all
terminations today. Some recent estimates suggest that only 2-4% of civil cases
are terminated by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and 8-10% are
terminated by a motion for summary judgment. As a point of reference, in 1970,
11% of all cases were terminated at trial. ' 8 We thus have swapped trials for pretrial
motions with respect to the aggressive component of adjudication. And most
importantly, these pretrial motions now cast the relevant shadows for settlement.
These pretrial substitutes for trials have been criticized for their anti-plaintiff
effects. Heightened pleading standards limit access to courts.19 Heightened
summary judgment standards limit access to trials.2" The invigoration of these
11. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The Fourth Era ofAmerican Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 1839 (2014) (finding pretrial motions challenging the merits of plaintiffs' claims played a very minor
role in litigation prior to the 1970s).
12. See Thomas 0. Main, Mediation: An Unlikely Villain, _ OHIO ST. J. ON D1SP. RESOL .. (2019)
(forthcoming).
13. See Resnik, supra note 4, at 925-26 (recounting the history of this phenomenon); Hon. Mark W.
Bennett, Essay: The Grand Poobah and Gorillas in our Midst: Enhancing Civil Justice in the Federal Courts-
Swapping Discovery Procedures in the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and Other Reforms Like
Trial by Agreement, 15 NEV. L.J. 1293, 1305-06 (2015) (same).
14. See Main, supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. Subrin & Main, supra note 11 (collecting sources, citing cases, and recounting history).
17. Id. (collecting sources, citing cases, and recounting history).
18. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl. C-5 (1970).
19. See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 823 24 (2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517,
527 (2010); Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 54 (2010); Benjamin A.
Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REv. 431, 466 (2008); Stephen N. Subrin, Ashcroft v. lqbal: Contempt
for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution, and Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L.J. 571, 575 (2012).
20. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
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pretrial motions has created a substantial risk of Type II errors at both stages. 21
Even a plaintiff who cannot satisfy a pleading or a production burden before trial
might, if allowed to continue with the litigation, be able to carry their persuasion
(and production) burden(s) at trial.
But such criticisms do not go nearly far enough. The shift from trials to pretrial
motions does not merely push the day of reckoning to an earlier stage of litigation
where false negatives may occur. Without trials, plaintiffs can never win on the
merits.
There has always been a fundamental asymmetry in the litigation postures of
plaintiffs and defendants. Defendants can win a case on a pretrial motion, or they
can win at trial. But with few exceptions, 22 plaintiffs can win a case only at a trial.
This asymmetry is attributed to the fact that plaintiffs carry the ultimate burden of
proof. To be sure, a plaintiff can defeat a defendant's motion to dismiss or motion
for summary judgment; and this would surely create settlement leverage. But by
defeating a pretrial motion, she only survives to fight another day. If the plaintiff
does not have the realistic prospect of a trial, then the plaintiff s only leverage-
even with a meritorious case-is the nuisance value of the litigation until some
non-trial event terminates the suit.
To be clear, my opposition here to this reframing of litigation is not about my
nostalgia for trials.2 3 This is not an argument about the Seventh Amendment being
compromised.24 This is not an argument that trials are the gold standard for
integrating law and fact.25 Rather it is an argument that, because trials are
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95 (1988); Brooke D.
Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know Versus What We Ought to Know, 43 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
705 (2012); Melissa Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1988); Suja Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007);
John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 522 (2007); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial
Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion, " Liability Crises, " and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in
Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1047 (2003).
21. See generally Mark Moller, Procedure's Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 703 (2011); Stempel, supra note
20, at 180-81 (1988).
22. A plaintiff can win her case on a summary judgment, but only in circumstances where the defendant's
evidence is insufficient on all elements of the cause of action. By contrast, defendants prevail where the plaintiff's
evidence is insufficient on any one element of the cause of action. See FED. R. CIv. P. 56. Similarly, a plaintiff
could win her case on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, but only in circumstances where the defendant
admits to all elements of the cause of action and, even then, only if the defendant also does not raise an affirmative
defense. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(c). Plaintiffs could also win if the defendant defaults or if the court enters judgment
for the plaintiff as a discovery sanction, although these would not be victories on the merits in the sense intended
here. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55; FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
23. 1 have already tried that. See Subrin & Main, supra note 11, at 1884. See also Young, supra note 2, at
83 (advocating a return to trials); Mark W. Bennett, Margaret H. Downie & Larry C. Zervox, Judges' Views on
Vanishing Civil Trials, 88 JUDICATURE 306, 308 (2005); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are
the "Litigation Explosion, " "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Clichds Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1134 (2003).
24. See Subrin & Main, supra note 11, at 1851. See also Thomas, supra note 20, at 145-54 (2007); Stempel,
supra note 20, at 162-65 (1988).
25. See Subrin & Main, supra note 11, at 1877-80 (2014); Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, The
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essentially the only mechanism in formal litigation where plaintiffs can win their
case, trials-or some other procedural technique where plaintiffs can win rather
than just not-lose-yet-are essential to basic fairness.
It is an empirical question whether trials still cast any meaningful shadow that
plaintiffs can leverage. Put another way, can a plaintiff who has evidence that
satisfies the summary judgment standard actually get a trial? To be sure, 2,469
cases reached the trial stage in 2018.26 Moreover, it is at least theoretically possible
that (many) more cases could be tried if only more plaintiffs were so inclined. In
this line of thinking, plaintiffs are avoiding trials. After all, trials are expensive;
maybe plaintiffs are increasingly risk averse. Similarly, the threat of losing at trial
may be so ominous that defendants are increasingly cost- and/or risk-averse, and
thus are offering generous settlement offers.
Yet if trials still cast a meaningful shadow, then we might expect not only more
than 2,469 trials per year, but also more cases settling on the eve of trials-when
the costs and risks of continuing would create leverage. However, cases do not
reach that stage. According to statistics recently collected by the Administrative
Office of U.S. Courts, about 88% of all civil cases are terminated (whether
passively or aggressively) before the Rule 16 pretrial conference.2 7 That
conference occurs within a few months of service of the complaint. 28 Thus, it
appears to be the shadow of the iron fist of a judge, rather than the shadow of a
trial, that shapes settlement negotiations. That shadow of the iron first is a product
of rulings on pre-trial motions and of encouraging settlements.
This combination of passive and aggressive adjudication leads me to conclude
with two research queries on my agenda.
The first is premised on the notion that plaintiffs do not have a realistic
prospect of trial. How should we expect judges to respond to this phenomenon?
One judicial response is to resist the premise and champion trials.2 9 But for the
fair-minded, justice-seeking public servants who accept the premise, the grossly
anti-plaintiff effects of eliminating trial's shadow must be intolerable. Appreciate
the allure of arbitration under such circumstances: arbitration is a forum where
plaintiffs have the prospect of prevailing on the merits. Appreciate also that when
plaintiffs' only leverage in litigation is the nuisance value of their suits, increasing
the delays and costs associated with litigation has some pro-plaintiff effects.
Integration of Law and Fact in an Unchartered Parallel Procedural Universe, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1981
(2004). See also Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts For? Have We Forsaken the Procedural Gold Standard?, 78
LA. L. REV. 739 (2018); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to lqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DuKE L.J 1, 5 (2010).
26. See supra note 5.
27. 2018 AO REPORT, supra note 3.
28. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b)(2).
29. See, e.g., Hon. William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, 50 FED. LAW. 30 (2003);
Mark W. Bennett, From the "No Spittin', No Cussin, and No Summary Judgment" Days of Employment
Discrimination to the "Defendant's Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Comment " Days: One Judge's Four-
Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCHL. L. REV. 685, 704 (2012); Anderson, Jr., supra note 2. See also U.S. v.
Mass., 781 F. Supp. 2d 1,21-27 (D. Mass. 2011).
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The second query is premised on the notion that plaintiffs still have some
realistic prospect of trial. How many more cases could be tried if parties who
preferred a trial simply resisted judicial efforts to get them to settle? Specifically,
I wonder whether we are we teaching our students to be too deferential to judges.
Indeed, I worry that we are not arming our students with the confidence and tools
to resist judicial efforts to settle.
610
